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Trasformismo or Transformation? The Global Political Economy of 
Energy Transitions  
Abstract 
 
What does IPE have to contribute to pressing policy and academic debates about the urgently required 
transition to a low carbon global economy? Despite the obviously global, political and economic 
dimensions of such a transition – often likened to the ‘great transformation’ or the Industrial Revolution 
in its magnitude – insights from IPE have yet to be brought to bear on the question of what form such 
a transition might take: the relations of power which will frustrate or enable it; the historical precedents 
for previous transformations in dominant structures of production, finance and technology in the global 
economy; and the potentially central role of the state and institutions of global governance. This article 
seeks to contribute to the analysis of transitions grounded in different strands of literature from neo-
Gramscian and historical materialist IPE and political economy more broadly. It focusses, in turn, on 
the role of the state in transitions; the ways in which the globalisation of the global economy structures 
the possibility and likely form of transitions; and the role of global governance institutions in key energy 
and economic domains. For scholars of IPE, it demonstrates the centrality of energy in linking power, 
production and world order and highlights the need to further engage with questions of transformation 
in energy systems that are central to the organisation of the global political economy. This throws up 
questions around production, finance, technology, governance and justice which IPE scholars should 
be well placed to speak to, while requiring that energy takes up its rightful place as a lens for 
understanding and revising orthodox comprehensions of political, economic and social processes. 
Keywords: energy-transitions-capitalism-climate change-hegemony-power-production 
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“The ‘Great transformation’- the ecological conversion of industrial societies into a climate 
compatible, resource-conserving and sustainable world economic order, requires far-reaching and 
manifold tasks to shape it, which, in their make-up, are neither purely scientific and technological nor 
purely social or political. The transformation process should lead to just and sustainable governance 
over the use and management of global, regional and local commons”. (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
2013) 
 
1. Introduction: Great Transformations  
Human-induced climate change is at the epicentre of renewed attention to the need for (another) ‘great 
transformation’ amid talk of a new, or third, ‘low carbon’ industrial revolution, requiring disruptive 
change in the form of radical reductions in emissions and large-scale technological breakthroughs as 
part of the pressing need for transition to a low carbon global economy (WBGU 2011). As the quote 
above highlights, however, a great transformation also implies nothing less than the creation of a 
‘sustainable world economic order’ entailing ‘just and sustainable governance over the use and 
management of the global, regional and local commons’, placing the challenge firmly on the terrain of 
International Relations and IPE. 
 
Notwithstanding recent literatures in IR on global energy governance (Florini and Sovacool 2009; van 
de Graaf 2013), and on global climate governance (cf Bulkeley and Newell 2014; Hoffmann 2011), the 
global politics and political economy of transition from one energy order to another, as is required to 
address climate change, have been neglected. Besides a very recent spike in interest (Di Muzio and 
Ovadia 2016; Van de Graaf et al 2016), Susan Strange’s invitation in her seminal book on States and 
Markets (1988) to take energy seriously in IPE has not been taken up for the most part where a mutual 
neglect by IPE scholars of questions of energy (beyond oil) and energy transitions in particular, as well 
as by energy policy scholars of IPE persists, thereby frustrating a productive cross-pollination of 
insights. Given the centrality of energy to state power, geo-politics, international economic relations 
and the global politics of sustainability, this is particularly surprising and problematic. 
Beyond IR, the overwhelming technological and economic focus of many policy and academic debates 
focussed on (socio-technical) transitions has been to the detriment of a fuller engagement with the 
deeper politics of transition where attention to global political dimensions is particularly notable in its 
absence. Within academia, a literature on transitions and transitions management has developed to 
identify and explain the necessary components of a socio-technical transition (Elzen et al, 2004; Geels, 
2005; Loorbach, 2007). This explores the interaction of elements of a socio-technical system across 
several levels, from a niche technology and its supporters seeking to break into a market controlled by 
incumbent interests - thought to be part of a ‘regime’ (often assumed to be operating at the national 
level) - up to a series of landscape pressures. These include climate change and shifts in international 
energy markets which exert disruptive pressure upon the regime as the prevailing way of organising an 
energy system and its services, the effect of which is to enable a transition away from this dominant 
mode of organisation. The need to understand the ways in which pressures from above and below can 
‘lead to cracks, tensions and windows of opportunity’ (Geels 2010: 495) opens up space for insights 
from IPE about who the agents are in this process and how the forms of power that they exercise are 
able to bring about transitions in energy systems.    
 
But while useful in exploring the role of emergent or so-called ‘niche’ technologies (such as wind and 
solar) and policy regimes, literature on socio-technical transitions continues to neglect questions of 
politics and power beyond specific management strategies and governance practices (Shove & Walker, 
2007; Scrase & Smith, 2009; Scoones et al 2015). Recent contributions have sought to address this 
neglect (Meadowcroft 2011; Geels 2014; Kern 2011; Kuzemko et al 2016), but placing power, political 
economy and world orders at the forefront of analysis, as is proposed here, both challenges and goes 
beyond this useful but narrower focus upon socio-technical transitions and their governance. It does so 
by foregrounding the relations of global power which shape particular institutional configurations and 
socio-technical possibilities.  
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It is argued here that attending to the role of states in energy transitions; the enabling and constraining 
effect of contemporary globalisation; and the role of global governance institutions can form the basis 
of constructive engagement with these debates drawing on insights from literatures in critical IPE in 
particular. It provides a source of clues as to the prospects of steering the great forces of human history 
in more sustainable directions – in particular, towards the de-carbonisation of the global economy – by 
drawing attention to the relationships among states, the global economy, and global governance. This 
serves to highlight vulnerabilities, weak spots, and active agents of change that will need to be enrolled 
in any project of transformation beyond more narrowly conceived socio-technical transitions.  
 
An approach grounded in historical materialism lends a more historical perspective to debates about 
precedents for and the possibilities of transitions and transformations in society and the economy—not 
just in alignments of technology and social practice. This is consistent with an historical materialist 
approach to studying an emergent world order ‘in terms of its economic, political and socio-cultural 
dimensions, with a view to its emerging contradictions and limits and the possibilities these imply for 
different collectivities’ (Gill 1993: 16). Gramsci distinguishes this approach to showing how ideas and 
material conditions are always bound together, from a more reductionist ‘historical economism’ which 
reduces all explanations to the material sphere (Gramsci 1971). This approach can build on previous 
histories of transitions which emphasise factors such as the role of prices, science and human capital 
(Fouquet & Pearson, 2012; Grubler, 2012; Pearson & Foxon, 2012; Allen, 2012). But rather than view 
the technological and the social context which supported particular transitions in isolation, the emphasis 
here is on identifying the underlying political, historical and material factors that enable large-scale 
transformations to take place which will inform our understanding of the contemporary global politics 
of energy transitions. This is critical to appreciating the terrain upon which competing social forces will 
contest the future organisation of the economy in a carbon constrained world, based on their role in 
shaping and resisting previous political change and how they have engaged with the challenge of an 
energy transition to date (Podobnik, 2006), given that the scale of the challenge is often likened to that 
of creating a new global Industrial Revolution.  
 
This more explicitly political and historical analysis allows us to move beyond glib statements about 
‘green growth’ and ‘win-win solutions’ to the climate crisis to reveal the conflicts, trade-offs and 
compromises implicit in a fundamental re-structuring of an economy and the relations of power that 
will determine which pathways are pursued. The ‘incumbent’ regime of existing actors and interests, 
that benefit from on-going reliance on a fossil fuel economy and that have played such a decisive role 
in the development of capitalism over the last century and beyond (Yergin 2008), will not give up their 
position easily. Nor will states that depend indirectly on the revenues generated by these actors be likely 
to initiate or welcome structural change. Since energy use, in particular, is closely correlated with 
growth, proposals to transform its provision and distribution confront both high levels of state 
intransigence to reform proposals, as well as financial and political support for fossil fuel interests that 
continue to provide the lion’s share of the world’s energy (Newell and Paterson 1998). 
 
In order to construct this analysis, the paper draws on work within different strands of IPE and political 
economy literature to develop an understanding of the politics of transformation and the relations of 
power which enable and frustrate progress towards a lower carbon economy. Herein lies the tension 
between the increasingly recognised need for transformation and the ability of incumbent actors to 
narrow the debate to questions of incremental transition through ‘trasformismo’. This refers to the 
ability to accommodate pressures for more radical and disruptive change and to employ combinations 
of material, institutional and discursive power to ensure that shifts which do occur in socio-technical 
configurations do not disrupt prevailing social relations and distributions of political power. The 
Gramscian concept of ‘trasformismo’ describes a process of co-optation that ‘serves as a strategy for 
assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the 
dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of organised opposition to established social 
and political power’ (Cox 1983: 166-7). In the current world order a combination of ideational, 
institutional and material sources of power serve to maintain the status quo and accommodate pressures 
for more far-reaching change, in ways usefully highlighted in work which draws on Antonio Gramsci’s 
insights on hegemony (Cox 1987; Levy and Newell 2002).  
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The question, explored later in the paper, is whether the historic bloc which results from this power and 
sustains the fossil fuel economy is slowly crumbling and whether a new one might emerge from the 
interregnum organised around a new configuration of social forces, state power and different fractions 
of capital. Though identifying and examining all elements of the assemblages which sustain fossil fuel 
incumbency is beyond the scope of this paper, I suggest below that the incumbent regime around fossil 
fuels can usefully be understood as an expression of hegemony: an alignment of ‘structures and 
superstructures’ (Gramsci 1971: 366). As we do below, the analysis of the relationship between a 
particular material base and superstructure of institutions and ideologies has to be placed in the context 
of a particular historical moment in order to assess its vulnerability to change (Morton 2007).   
To ground such an analysis, the article first looks at the role of the state as a site of contestation between 
labour and different fractions of capital and civil society. An emphasis on the social relations which 
characterise the state provides a more critical and variegated account of the state’s role in ‘transition 
management’ (Loorbach 2007) than would be afforded by state/market binaries, shedding light on how 
the terms of transition are set and by whom: the contested terrain of accommodation and opposition 
around shifts to the energy regime. Second, it explores how re-orderings of the international economic 
system in the form of the globalisation of production and its associated shifts in power (i.e. disciplinary 
neo-liberalism and a finance-led regime of accumulation) have both imposed constraints, but also 
opened up vulnerabilities and opportunities to lever change. Third, it looks at the prevailing global 
energy order and in particular at the governance and un-governance of energy transitions, as it is 
practiced by institutions with explicit environmental and energy mandates, as well indirectly by global 
trade and investment regimes. This includes an emphasis on the role of multilateral development banks 
and donors in constraining the policy autonomy of (some) states to manage transitions on their own 
terms.  
This analysis and the framework for interpreting it reveals, on one level, the contested terrain of 
transition where there is competition between incumbent regimes locked into the reproduction of 
energy systems largely reliant on the use of fossil fuels and niche technology providers and financiers 
seeking to carve out a lower-emissions market share. On another level, however, it highlights a deeper 
tension at play around the disputed need for transformation. The difference lies between modest re-
arrangements in modes of regulating and governing technology and social systems which shift 
technology and regulation in lower carbon directions, but without disrupting dominant distributions of 
economic and political power, as opposed to calls for a ‘just transition’ or deeper transformations where 
questions of who owns and has access to production, finance and technology are also at stake and the 
overall development pathway is up for negotiation (Stirling 2014). In this context trasformismo is the 
political attempt to manage this terrain: to ensure that politics and policy reinforce a market liberal 
approach to transitions within capitalism as opposed to more sweeping transformations of it. This is 
visible in the attempts to align responses to climate change with the imperatives of capitalist 
accumulation, accommodating and obscuring its indictment of a fossil-fuelled global political economy.      
2. Towards a GPE of Energy Transitions 
 
In order to develop the basis of a contribution from IR to these critical global debates I draw on resources 
within political economy and IPE to deepen an understanding of the global political economy of 
transitions. While an argument can be made that British and American schools of IPE have something 
to contribute to understandings of energy transitions (Kern and Markard 2016; Kuzemko et al 2018, 
this SI), this paper highlights a series of missing dimensions that can be addressed by engaging more 
critical traditions. The neo-Gramscian approach adopted here is distinct from accounts which could 
draw on liberal IPE to explore the global governance of energy, or the relationship between energy and 
trade, for example, as a product of inter-state regime formation rather than the broader social relations 
of power explored here. Or, drawing on Realist IPE, to link the geopolitics of energy to the shifting 
balance of power in the world without reference to the material base of institutional and ideational 
superstructures upon which it rests. The account developed here helps to address basic concerns with 
who and how and for whom production is organised and re-organised in a given historical period: the 
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relations of power which underpin this and what this might imply for current efforts to transition to a 
different production base with its attendant political implications. Understanding the prospects of 
change in the contemporary context requires attention to the nature and distribution of power among 
those actors that control the forms of production, finance and technology that at once (re) produce the 
current climate-energy crisis and, at the same time, need to be transformed along lower carbon lines. 
Given that the very actors dominating and benefiting most from the status quo are the ones that assume 
the authority and power to address it, it is hardly surprising that such global elites prefer trasformismo 
– limited forms of transition aimed at creating new sites of accumulation for finance and technology 
providers – to transformations in the base of production and the relations of power. 
What an account grounded in (international) political economy, as it is presented here, draws attention 
to is the role of social forces in organising and re-organising capitalism. This helps us then to identify 
some of the drivers of our current predicament and the terrain upon which short-term change will have 
to be built. In so doing it re-engages with the politics and political economy of ‘great transformations’ 
(Polanyi 1980) which get overlooked in contemporary reformulations of transformations as exercises 
in assembling a new round of growth, investment and technology without attending to the social and 
power relations which underpin them (Stirling 2014). Neo-Gramscian scholarship, in particular (Cox, 
1987; Gill, 1993; Rupert, 1995), which holds the relationship between production, power and world 
order at the heart of its analysis, can form the basis of such an account through an emphasis on the role 
of historic blocs in sustaining particular energy orders as well as being alert to transformational 
possibilities within and beyond them. I suggest that such an approach is particularly pertinent because 
climate change presents us with the need for change in the prevailing political order (of states and 
institutions, of the base of production, industries, technologies and ideas and the links between them) 
rather than a potentially more modest shift in technology and series of discrete social practices. This is 
because energy is the life-blood of the economy (Huber 2013) and the basis of industrial civilisation 
(Malm 2016) and its growth imperatives and is intimately entwined with security politics (see Wilson 
this SI): it links production, power and world order in ways that must assume a central place in our 
analysis.  
Re-positioning debates about transitions from understanding socio-technical change to the study of how 
ideational, institutional and material forms of power are brought to bear to shape global energy 
pathways, creates a space for scholars of IPE to furnish an account of how change occurs in international 
society, an appreciation of the social relations of production and insights into how existing orders seek 
to accommodate threats to their legitimacy. Firstly, a focus on state power and competing social forces 
sheds light on the role of the state in mediating struggles and conflicts between labour and capital, in 
projecting global power, as well as shaping and being shaped by global institutions which extend or 
circumscribe their control over energy (politics). It highlights competition between different fractions 
of capital and their reliance upon particular types of energy for the success of their accumulation 
strategies and the central role of labour in struggles over control of the means of production and the 
proposed beneficiaries of a ‘just transition’ to a lower carbon economy (Swilling and Annecke 2012). 
This goes beyond the narrower question of how to govern energy transitions (Verbong and Loorbach 
2012) while also transgressing the bounded notions of state and market that often frame enquiries in 
IPE.  
 
Secondly, attention to the role of globalisation is critical to understanding the both the production of 
climate change and the scope for articulating lower carbon pathways in a globalised economy. For 
example, it draws attention to the power afforded to finance capital by enhanced mobility in conditions 
of heightened globalisation to delimit the range of policy options available to states. But it also 
highlights the role of finance in enabling technological revolutions and unsettling incumbent regimes, 
suggesting scope to re-organise the energy base around what Regulation theorists refer to as a new 
‘regime of accumulation’ and ‘mode of regulation’ (Aglietta, 2000). The concept of regime of 
accumulation refers to the way in which production, circulation, consumption, and distribution organize 
and expand capital in a way that stabilizes the economy over time. The modes of regulation required to 
stabilize these regimes include the law, state policy, corporate governance and cultures of consumption 
which are increasingly transnational in nature, as elaborated below in the discussion on the 
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internationalization of the state. Indeed, as Jessop suggests, socially embedded and regularized 
institutions and social forces are ‘organized around the expanded reproduction of capital as a social 
relation’ (Jessop 2002:7; emphasis added). Understanding this shift in power is important to 
understanding changes in the global economic ‘landscape’ affect national energy transition strategies.  
 
Thirdly, attention to the global governance of energy transitions is critical to understanding not only the 
specific role of global institutions in the energy, environment and trade domains, but also provides an 
entry point for comprehending the energy world order of which they are part and which they collectively 
represent. Whereas the historic bloc favouring fossil energy has been hegemonic to date  as a material 
base and institutional superstructure, the analysis here, consistent with a neo-Gramscian analysis, 
explores the extent to which change in the incumbent order might be possible and where a shift from 
transition under conditions of trasformismo to broader forms of transformation could be envisaged.  
 
3. States of Transition 
In debates about transitions to a low carbon economy there is much emphasis on the role of state as the 
principal actor that will manage, enable or facilitate progress towards a transition using its convening 
power to bring together key actors, broker deals  and construct transition plans as many industrialised 
and developing countries have now done (see also Kuzemko 2018, this SI). Yet as Lawton and Murphy 
note of the transitions literature, ‘importantly, and sometimes problematically, the state is typically 
portrayed as a progressive, collaborative, “facilitator-stimulator-controller-director” of the transition 
management process’ (Lawton and Murphy 2011: 359), without attention to the different dimensions 
of state power and what these imply for the possibility and likely form of transitions (Johnstone and 
Newell 2017). The role of the state in relation to transitions can range from supporting research, 
development and innovation in its entrepreneurial form (Mazzucato 2011), employing a plethora of 
policy tools and economic instruments to tax, support, protect and regulate industries, using the 
machinery of democratic government to promote and safeguard spaces of deliberation over competing 
energy futures, as well as more regressively using its monopoly on the use of force to acquire land, 
criminalise protest and overturn opposition to large energy projects (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014).  
 
This is the first area where critical IPE can contribute to our understanding of the role of the state in 
global energy transitions. There is clearly uneven power, capability and inclination among states to 
assume the roles ascribed to them in transition plans, their own NDCs (Nationally Determined 
Contributions) submitted to the climate negotiations and global sustainability strategies such as the 
SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). This is a function of capacity (political and economic) as well 
as willingness to engage in transition processes given close ties that often exist with incumbent 
economic interests that are threatened by interventions which jeopardise their ability to maximise profits 
from their existing control over production, technology and finance. In many contexts, incumbent actors 
have the power to set the terms and pace of transition by being conferred a role in determining access 
for new market entrants. Thus in South Africa, the monopoly electricity supplier Eskom was given a 
key role in deciding which independent power producers were allowed to enter the country’s profitable 
energy market (Baker et al 2014).  
In this regard, critical IPE literatures raise questions about who the state serves and whose interests the 
state is most responsive to. Given the intimate connection between predominantly fossil-based energy 
and growth, providers of that energy acquire structural power over state managers, enabling large 
energy companies to argue that serving their needs provides a sure means of stimulating the economy 
as a whole such that they should not be treated as a business interest like any other (Newell and Paterson 
1998). The challenge from this perspective is how to create a sense in which the interests of capital in 
general are served by a shift to a low carbon economy by constructing ‘coalitions of the winning and 
the willing’ from such a transition (Newell and Paterson 2010).  This implies a fluidity in the 
composition of social forces within the state. In Gramscian terms ‘the state is conceived of as a 
continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria between the interests of the 
fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups- equilibria in which the interests of the dominant 
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group prevail but only up to a certain point’ (1971: 182), suggesting scope for niches and competing 
interests to unsettle incumbent power.  
 
Thinking about the state in terms of the balance of forces competing to shape energy policy is important 
to explain what might be possible (in terms of capacity), who sets the terms of a transition debate: 
external and internal constraints and veto coalitions; and whom it benefits. Concretely this will help to 
determine the likelihood that a low carbon energy pathway be aligned with broader social and 
developmental goals as suggested by notions of ‘climate compatible development’ (Maxwell and 
Mitchell 2010), or the idea of a ‘just transition’ (Swilling and Annecke 2012; Newell and Mulvaney 
2013) where, beyond picking winning technologies and companies, the emphasis is on a broader social 
compact for transition that also compensates and rewards potential losers from a shift in strategy. While 
developmental states (Leftwich 2000) and ‘green entrepreneurial states’ can adopt pro-active industrial 
policy though the use of tax and Research and Development policies, for example, and steer markets to 
align them with nationally determined developmental goals as China, India and Brazil have done 
(Pegels 2013), many other states have less freedom of manoeuvre.  
What critical IPE brings to this discussion then, drawing on work on ‘developmental space’ and ‘policy 
autonomy’ (Wade 2003; Gallagher 2005), is a realistic sense of how much scope developing countries 
in particular have to pursue transitions on their own terms, given the extent to which they are dependent 
upon aid. While South Africa can insist on including conditions for investors in its public procurement 
programmes for renewable energy around local content requirements and Black Economic 
Empowerment, more aid-dependent countries in the region (such as Mozambique or Kenya) find their 
energy choices more strongly shaped by donors (Baker et al 2014). The diverse and uneven integration 
of states into the global economy also draws attention to the disciplining effect of trade rules which in 
some cases ‘kick away the ladder’ (Chang 2002) that richer countries used to industrialise (through 
subsidies, looser IPR arrangements, support to infant industries) which we can observe for example in 
conflicts at the WTO between the US and China over support to solar and wind industries (ICTSD 
2011). What these literatures may shed some light on is the extent to which and the ways in which 
countries’ freedom of manoeuvre to select energy pathways may be restricted by the disciplinary power 
of donors or international institutions, as in the case of Kenya’s ‘market-led’ energy transition (Newell 
and Phillips 2016). This usefully checks the assumption that transitions can be made up of open ended 
choices. Moreover, understanding this competitive terrain as a ‘green division of labour’ between states 
helpfully captures this ‘collective and interdependent process by dozens of states, all striving in different 
ways to promote capital accumulation on their soil ... the globally connected patterns through which 
different states and firms pursue accumulation in the local and global contexts in which they are 
embedded’ (Lachapelle et al 2017: 311-312).  
 
Adequately capturing the diversity among states’ positions within the global political economy and their 
degree of independence from or control over the actors and sectors whose activities need to be 
transformed, requires a more nuanced and desegregated understanding of the state than is found in most 
IR accounts. Work looking at different models of states and their policy-making processes (whether 
more or less managed, market, corporatist, social democratic/state-led, deliberative or entrepreneurial) 
and what difference that makes to generating visions, negotiating with key actors and enacting change 
is particularly useful here (Kuzemko et al 2016; Kern 2011). Such an enquiry might also be informed 
by political economy work on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) given that the nature of 
bargaining with business and labour reflect different political economies and ideologies about the role 
of the state in the economy including in relation to key policy domains such as energy, industry and 
transport (Milkner and Harrison 2012). Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) show, for example, how 
coordinated market economies have established the most robust and generous regulatory and subsidy 
supports for renewables, including packages of traditional and market-based regulation of fossil energy, 
net metering policies, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy standards for utilities and subsidies for both 
manufacturers and installers of renewable technologies. This helps to account for the very different 
positions of the UK and Germany, for example, with regard to support for renewable energy, reflective 
of different electoral systems and attitudes towards the possibility and desirability of state intervention 
(Lockwood 2015).   
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More ambitious strategies for embracing renewable energy have been adopted in countries ranging from 
China and Kenya to Uruguay, Germany and Denmark, for a variety of different reasons, including 
seeking to secure first-mover advantages for state-owned and private firms (Germany, Denmark, India 
and China), reducing dependence on imported energy (India, Uruguay), and reducing vulnerability to 
the effects of climate change on energy generation capacity (such as hydropower) (Kenya). Countries 
are of course also hugely differently placed in terms of their location and degrees of interdependence 
with the global economy. A smaller, traditionally energy-importing country such as Uruguay, for 
example,  is better placed to adopt bold emissions reductions targets and derive 94.5% of its electricity 
from renewable energy, benefiting as it does from abundant alternative domestic sources to service its 
population of just 3.4 million (Watts 2015). Whilst there is not space to here to delve into these national 
experiences in greater depth, it is notable that variation in the institutional form of country level 
governance regimes, patterns of dependence on fossil fuel energy, systemic differences among states 
including their population densities, carbon intensity, and per capita incomes, play a part alongside 
variations in the traditions of economic intervention by states (Lachapelle and Paterson 2013). But even 
economies heavily dependent upon fossil fuels, such as Saudi Arabia, are seeking to diversify their 
energy mix (Van de Graaf & Bradshaw 2018, this SI), pointing again to the need to relate national 
situations to global contexts in order to avoid the ‘territorial trap’ of viewing these developments in 
isolation where comparative advantages in research and development, manufacturing and installation 
combine in different ways across these settings (Lachapelle et al 2017).  
 
Understanding the specific alignments of social forces requires attention to particular national contexts, 
nevertheless. In South Africa, for example, the ties between state and the corporate sector are described 
in terms of a ‘Minerals Energy Complex’ (MEC) (Baker et al 2014; Fine and Rustomjee 1996): a regime 
of accumulation based on low-cost state-owned electricity production (via the public utility Eskom), 
cheap labour and large-scale national and international corporate capital tightly bound to the energy and 
mining sectors. Getting within the state to look at the balance of power between competing social forces 
helps to identify where change might come from at a particular historical juncture and why the nature 
and pace of diversification of the energy mix is being directed so tightly by the incumbent regime, as 
with South Africa’s RE-IPPPP (Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement 
Programme). Historically, the importance of assuring a social contract or pact between capital and 
labour emerges as key to attempts to re-organise production and has implications for the prospects of a 
‘just transition’ and, in particular, how labour might benefit from a switch of industrial base to lower 
carbon forms of energy. 
What these literatures from IPE and beyond point to is not only the importance of a more critical and 
realistic understanding of what roles states are able and willing to play in transition processes, but also 
an appreciation of the social relations crystallised in the use (as well as non-use) of state power towards 
transformational ends (Brand 2008; Newell 2008).  
4. Globalisation: The Transformative Power of Finance 
Literatures and perspectives from IR and IPE can make a second, essential, contribution to debates 
about transitions by developing and theorising the global dimensions of transitions and the ways in 
which the organisation of the global economy enables and constrains particular types of transition 
projects. While literatures on socio-technical transitions refer to ‘landscape factors’ which impinge 
upon the possibility of transitions as comprising the structuring forces of ideologies, institutions, 
discourses and political and economic trends that constitute enduring forms of socio-technical 
organization, they lack an account of the ways in which these are expressed as practices of power.  
A common theme in critical IPE literatures is the extent to which and the ways in which contemporary 
forms of globalisation restrict the policy menu of states to interventions compatible with the 
requirements of a neo-liberal global economy (Appelbaum and Robinson 2005). Indeed, a key aspect 
of the global political economy of energy transitions is the neo-liberal context in which they have to 
occur. The exercise of what neo-Gramscians refer to as ‘disciplinary power’ (Gill 1995) over states’ 
energy pathways is not just confined to developing countries over whom multilateral institutions can 
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exercise more structural power, as we will see in the next section. There are also very real constraints 
upon richer countries’ freedom of manoeuvre in a globalised and liberalised economy. Threats of capital 
flight invoked by fossil fuel energy interests and fears among state elites of incumbents losing 
competitiveness have been frequent features of efforts to introduce climate mitigation measures. It has 
played out, for example, in debates about carbon taxes such as the EU’s carbon tax debate in early 1990s 
which prompted what The Economist at the time described as the most vociferous lobbying campaign 
ever mounted by industry, including energy intensive industries (Newell and Paterson 1998), and more 
recently over back-loading proposals in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to create scarcity and 
push up prices, resisted by many utilities on competitiveness and carbon leakage grounds.  
 
In understanding why states are so sensitive to such pressures, we can draw upon  Cox’s reflections on 
the internationalisation of the state whereby, ‘Adjustment to global competitiveness is the new 
categorical imperative’ (Cox 1993: 260). In echoes of Poulanztas (2014), Jessop too draws attention to 
the ways in which the reorientation of economic and political strategies in response to globalization has 
served to ‘modify the institutional materiality and strategic bias of accumulation regimes and their 
associated political frameworks’ (2002:7). In Gramscian understandings, states are often conceived of 
as transmission belts for the preferences of a transnational class from the global into national economic 
spheres. This involves the formation of coalitions and historic blocs of social forces across, as well as 
within countries (Cox 1987). The discussion below, for example, shows how combinations of investors, 
donors and state elites have secured and enforced a dominant view of the desirability and efficacy of 
market-led energy transitions over more transformative alternatives.  
 
What a critical account would also want to emphasise, however, is the potential for transformation: 
fractures and vulnerabilities in the existing (energy) order. In this context, shifts in power resulting from 
globalisation might also create opportunities to de-stabilise dominant regimes. Notable in this regard is 
the interest that one set of powerful actors in this current phase of neo-liberalism – global finance – has 
shown in de-carbonisation. This builds on IPE scholars’ emphasis on the ways in which, in an era of 
post-Fordism, the current finance-led regime of accumulation has become the dominant growth model 
in the contemporary global economy from the late 1970s and early 1980s. This affords global finance 
a potentially decisive role in the form that responses to climate change take (Paterson 2010). Departing 
from an historic role in literally fuelling the industries and underwriting the infrastructures that have 
given rise to our current planetary predicament, finance is increasingly central to debates about 
divestment from fossil fuels, disclosure and re-positioning investments in fossil fuels as liabilities rather 
than assets. This is manifest in active engagement of finance capital from banks and  investment 
companies to pension funds, hedge funds and the like, in carbon trading, carbon disclosure schemes and 
capitalising on the new carbon economy.  
Recognising the heightened power of finance in this phase of capitalist development means asking 
questions about the opportunities of trying to harness that power to the project of decarbonisation (see 
also Neville et al 2018, this SI). For example, there is increasing pressure to disclose the carbon in 
companies’ portfolios: from the Securities and Exchange Commission rulings, for example, forcing 
companies to disclose information about GHG emissions alongside their financial reporting or the wave 
of shareholder activism that has emerged over the last 10 years (Newell 2008). This both sensitises 
investors to the risks they may be exposed to and provides them with the necessary information to assess 
risks across higher and lower carbon portfolios. For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
works with a network of investors and purchasers, representing over $100 trillion in assets, to help 
reveal the risk in their investment portfolios and aims ultimately to sensitise investors to climate change 
as an opportunity as well as a threat (CDP 2017). This relates to broader warnings about ‘un-burnable 
carbon’ and the ‘stranded assets’ that many investors may be left with in order to realise ambitions to 
keep warming below 2 or 3 degrees are to be achieved. By some calculations between 60-80% of coal, 
oil and gas reserves of publicly listed companies are ‘un-burnable’ if the world is to have a chance of 
not exceeding global warming of 2°C (McGlade and Ekins 2015). Even ExxonMobil, traditionally a 
recalcitrant in the climate debate, has faced a large investor inquiry issued to the 45 top fossil fuel 
companies, coordinated by Ceres and Carbon Tracker, and representing $3tn (£1.8tn) in assets (see also 
Neville et al 2018, this SI). It asked Exxon to report on how it was preparing for a carbon-constrained 
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world where greenhouse gas regulation and market forces strand uneconomic assets, and whether 
money spent finding more reserves is in shareholder interests (Lamb and Fugere 2014). 
 
Seeking to engage and enrol finance capital in these ways comes with many limitations and 
contradictions and banks and investors are a fickle ally, but if the signals are ‘long, loud and legal’ 
(Hamilton 2009) that money can be made by investing first in a low carbon economy, then patient 
capital at least may be one element of a powerful coalition of the ‘winning and the willing’ regarding 
de-carbonisation. Historically, it is certainly the case that finance capital has been vital to creating waves 
of creative destruction which unsettle existing technologies, industries and bases of political power.  
Indeed, drawing on historical political economic analysis, Carlota Perez’s (2013) work reminds us of 
the key role of finance in supporting past transitions – the ‘grand experiments’ she refers to ‘when 
unrestrained finance can override the power of the old production giants and fund the new entrepreneurs 
in testing the vast new potential’. Though current debates about transitions and transformation place 
technology centrally in their vision of achieving a lower-carbon model of development, Perez shows 
that finance capital is crucial to the Schumpetarian ‘waves of creative destruction’ that challenge and 
dislodge the power of incumbents. Examples include the technological transformations produced in the 
Industrial Revolution, what she refers to as the ‘age of steam and railways’, and around ‘oil, automobile 
and mass production’ in the Fordist era described above, for example (Perez 2002). Indeed, as Arrighi 
notes: ‘Throughout the capitalist era financial expansions have signalled the transition from one regime 
of accumulation on a world scale to another. They are integral aspects of the recurrent destruction of 
‘old’ regimes and the simultaneous creation of new ones’ (2010: xi-xii). 
The strategic question is whether immensely powerful actors will enrol in the project of financing de-
carbonisation strategies and, in political economy terms, tip the balance of power further in favour of 
those pushing for a low carbon economy such that their interests come to be identified as those of 
‘capital-in-general’ (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978). Thus far, governments generally have not been 
bold enough to chart a clear course out of fossil fuels. Witness, for example, the deletion of text at Rio 
+ 20 in 2012 calling for reductions in fossil fuel subsidies that stand at around US$5.3 trillion a year 
(IMF 2015). It is perhaps unsurprising then that, as Di Muzio concludes, ‘investors are nowhere near 
betting on a future outside of fossil fuel energy’ (2012: 365). Indeed, the oil giant Exxon in a report on 
Energy and Carbon – Managing the Risk, ironically released the same day as the latest UN IPCC report 
warned of the catastrophic effect climate change will have on world populations, stated ‘We are 
confident that none of our hydrocarbon reserves are now or will become “stranded”’, predicting there 
was no danger shareholders would lose value in a carbon-constrained world (O’Meara 2014). 
 
While an IPE account drawing on Regulation theory would provide an appreciation of both how global 
finance came to be so powerful at this historical juncture and of the forms of power it exercises over 
states, our understanding of the role of finance capital needs to be further disaggregated in order to 
assess the likelihood of different forms of capital playing an active role in accelerating low carbon 
energy transitions (Spratt 2015). While ‘patient’ capital might be able to wait for a return over longer 
time frame, this is not true of private equity investors and hedge funds (Mazzucato 2011). Different 
types of finance capital each operate according to different thresholds of risk regarding the places, 
technologies and projects they are willing to invest in and on what basis. This takes us back to the role 
of the state in setting the direction of change, such that a lower carbon energy future looks attractive 
and financially viable to powerful investors for whom states are keen to create and nurture new sites of 
accumulation. In this regard coordinated market economies may more able to construct ‘long, loud and 
legal’ signals to patient capital investors than liberal ones which may give a freer rein to restless capital 
focussed on a short-term return.  
In terms of the analysis here, the key point is to emphasise the role of finance, as one powerful fraction 
of capital, whose interests might yet be de-linked from the idea that the interests of capital in general 
are best served by an accumulation regime dependent on fossil fuels. In this sense, strategies of 
divestment, disclosure and shareholder activism build on a longer history of attempts by activists to 
engage financial actors, such as the insurance industry, as a way of breaking up the bloc of industrial 
power traditionally opposed to action on climate change (Leggett, 1996; Paterson, 2001). 
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5. Global Governance and World Order 
The third area where IPE can make an important contribution to the theorisation and practice of 
transitions is around global governance. Though work on socio-technical transitions lists ‘institutions’ 
as one among many ‘landscape’ factors that can shape conditions for disruptive change, critical thinking 
about the role of global governance institutions in enabling and constraining transitions has been largely 
absent.  
There is, nevertheless, a growing body of work on global energy governance which looks at key 
institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), OPEC (Colgan 2014) and coordinating 
mechanisms such as UN-Energy (van de Graaf 2013; Goldthau and Karlsson-Vinkhuyen 2010). This 
has focussed mainly on classic IR questions of how much autonomy such institutions enjoy from states, 
the power they exercise over their members and how successfully they are able to coordinate 
cooperation. The extent to which and the ways in which they shape, enable or inhibit particular 
transition pathways has been less explored. Yet a global political economy of transitions requires an 
account of the ways in which institutions of global energy and climate change governance, as well as a 
broader set of multilateral economic institutions, and their unequal inter-relationship enable and 
constrain particular energy pathways.  
The multiple and overlapping dimensions of energy transitions – particularly, the need to address energy 
security, energy poverty and climate change issues simultaneously – creates a huge challenge for the 
current global order centred on an energy regime complex where different institutions are charged with 
addressing each of these issues separately. None have the mandate or capacity to orchestrate the re-
structuring of the global energy order as opposed to supporting discrete national or socio-technical 
transitions. Indeed, this scholarship demonstrates that global energy governance has traditionally been 
very weak (Florini and Sovacool 2009; Karlsson-Vinkhuyen 2010). It is possible to over-state the 
influence even of those actors in global energy governance considered to wield the most power, 
including ‘Producer clubs’ such as OPEC, ‘consumer clubs’ such as the IEA, or groupings dominated 
by wealthier countries such as the G8 and OECD. Despite greater attention to energy issues in 
international relations from the Gleneagles summit in 2005 onwards,  and the proliferation of public-
private partnerships (PPPs) and transnational governance in the energy domain (Bulkeley et al. 2012), 
overall global energy governance remains weak, fragmented and incoherent from point of view of 
delivering low carbon transitions. For example, the World Bank – one of the most powerful actors in 
this arena as interim trustee of the Green Climate Fund and with its own extensive portfolio of Climate 
Investment Funds, and despite its ambition to lead the world on climate change – continues to provide 
high levels of finance to fossil fuels (USD $3 billion in 2014 alone) (Mathiesen 2015), undermining the 
IMF’s efforts to remove fossil fuel subsidies.  
 
Nevertheless, the observed under-development of global energy governance would not surprise most 
IR scholars. The proximity of energy to core state strategy, given its centrality to security and growth, 
make it a highly political issue. Energy chapters in trade agreements are often the most contested  
(Newell 2011). Indeed the problem is the extensive un-governance of energy (areas of deliberate non-
intervention) where lock-in means investor interests are well protected by trade rules and investment 
arbitration procedures observed in cases brought against governments by energy companies claiming 
they have been subject to trade discrimination (Newell 2007). This is not to rule out an important future 
role for institutions of global governance including setting new rules, levering new finance and creating 
new infrastructures, or playing more proactive coordinating functions as occurs in regional contexts 
such as the European Energy Charter. Indeed, there are frequent calls to strengthen existing institutions 
or to create new initiatives such as pleas for a global Marshall Fund or Apollo programme (King et al 
u.d) or to scale up support for renewable energy development and deployment as proposed at the Paris 
COP21 by the ‘Breakthrough Energy Coalition’ of twenty-five leading investors (Milman 2015).  
 
Yet, looked at together and more critically, it is clear that the purpose of existing global bodies with a 
direct mandate to address energy issues is more ‘market-enabling’ than ‘market-restricting’ – providing 
regulation ‘for’ energy corporations rather than ‘of’ them – and showing a strong commitment to energy 
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market liberalisation. Bodies such as the IEA, World Bank and OECD are unsurprisingly committed to 
a ‘market liberal’ view of the role of the state and the means by which de-carbonisation, in so far as it 
is considered at all, is to be achieved: though pricing, innovation and technology development and 
transfer, to the exclusion of other pathways to transition or transformation. The unevenly shared power 
to shape transition pathways is especially relevant when considering the relationship between 
multilateral development banks and lower income states in the global South. Neo-Gramscians refer to 
‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Gill, 1995)1 in this regard: a set of practices pursued by key international 
institutions and multilateral development banks, in constraining the policy autonomy and 
developmental space of poorer countries over which they exercise control through their lending 
practices, conferring financial support upon policies they approve of, or withdrawing it from those they 
do not (Gallagher 2005). This raises key questions about which instruments states have available to 
address the challenges of de-carbonising their economies when many have ceded direct control over 
their energy sectors and when forms of policy intervention historically used to support new energy 
regimes in the past (e.g. subsidies, infant industry protection and looser forms of intellectual property 
protection) are increasingly circumscribed by trade rules.  
Processes of power sector reform in the global South are particularly revealing of particular ways in 
which pressures are brought to bear to reconfigure energy systems. Multilateral development banks 
have played a leading role in re-structuring the domestic economies of developing economies and 
reducing their scope for autonomous action. The increasingly obvious need for regulation and steering 
of economies onto a lower carbon energy trajectory has become apparent at a time when many states 
have relinquished, or been forced to relinquish, control over key parts of their energy sectors (such as 
generation, distribution, transmission) as a result of energy and power sector reform programmes 
promoted by the World Bank in particular (Tellam 2000). For example, Kenya’s adoption of neoliberal 
energy sector reforms has been rewarded by support from bilateral and multilateral donors, opening up 
opportunities for foreign capital to meet the shortfall in energy supply. In this sense it is unsurprising 
that Kenya has been described as an obvious choice of pilot country for climate finance mechanisms 
such as the World Bank’s Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP). Kenya has been 
described as ‘the pilot for everything’ and is often compared favourably with neighbours, such as 
Tanzania, on the basis that, as a World Bank official put it, ‘Kenya has always been private sector 
focused and avoided the virulent forms of socialism of some of its neighbours’ (cited in Newell and 
Phillips 2016).  
In a more critical vein, and going beyond a focus on questions of institutional emergence, evolution and 
effectiveness, critical IPE might also offer useful insights into the question of the role of energy in the 
world order. Following the neo-Gramscian work of Robert Cox (1987) implies a focus on the 
relationships among power, production and world order: the ideas, institutions and material capabilities 
that produce a particular energy order. Di Muzio (2015) refers to ‘carbon capitalism’ as the key to 
understanding the interconnections among energy, social reproduction and world order which reproduce 
a particular type of ‘petro-market civilisation’. Here the emphasis is on how particular ideas and 
institutions reflect and seek to protect particular structures of power and production. This is sustained 
by a particular material base, enforced by military means to secure supplies, and expressed 
institutionally in the forms of global governance alluded to above. This takes us into the realms of the 
geo-politics of energy. Beyond detailing and accounting for power and resistance to change, this work 
also has an explicit focus on transformation: how one order declines and another rises (as with the 
transition from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana) over decades and centuries (Bromley 1991). 
Fordism, which peaked in the post-World War II decades of American dominance and mass 
consumerism, is also intimately connected to US global power (Rupert, 1995), just as the expansion of 
the industrial revolution was to Pax Britannica. Oil was central to the Fordist vision and securing access 
to it has become a key geo-political goal in its own right as part of the project of the ‘new imperialism’ 
pursued under the guise of creating a ‘new world order’ (Harvey, 2003; Rees, 2001; Kaldor et al, 2007). 
The securitization of energy at once fuels and reinforces the power of the military industrial complex 
consolidating the material capacity to secure and extract more energy. In this sense, as Huber  notes, 
‘the ecological politics of climate change and the anti-war politics of Iraq both converge on a similar 
object of disdain – oil’ (2008: 105). Moving beyond carbon means unsettling a politico-military order 
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that both consumes and secures vast amounts of fossil fuels. The U.S. military alone uses more oil than 
any other institution in the world (Union of Concerned Scientists 2017). 
This is, however, a world order in flux characterised by on-going redistributions of power among states. 
Hence discussions about transitions should engage with a shifting landscape of power (in a general 
sense and in the sense transition theories use the term). Shifting geometries of power and geo-politics 
would include the enhanced power and resource demands of so-called ‘rising powers’ or BRICS. This 
refers not just to the strategies for acquiring new sources of energy, especially oil, to meet their energy 
and growth demands in ways likened problematically to a new wave of colonialism (Carmody 2011; 
Ayers 2013), nor merely to the enhanced bargaining leverage these powers now exercise in global 
institutions such as the WTO. But from an environmental point of view, how can we square their rising 
growth ambitions with climate constraints? Powers in the global North and South are making key 
decisions with huge and long-lasting lock-in effects for other richer and poorer countries pursued both 
through energy statecraft and via the investment strategies pursued by state owned enterprises and 
private TNCs. The global interdependencies that result from globalising strategies for securing energy 
security further challenge conventional ideas about state control over energy resources whether in 
relation to fossil fuels or through investments in ‘clean energy’, or as leading exporters of renewable 
energy technologies.  
 
The emerging energy order is, therefore, increasingly multi-polar and more fragmented, but not 
necessarily more inclusive or sustainable. There has been a re-balancing of power in the energy sector 
as with other domains away from the West and towards China and India in particular, and a greater 
accent on resource nationalism which potentially challenges neo-liberal orthodoxies. At the time, and 
despite growing interest in capitalising on the low carbon economy and the export and first mover 
advantages it confers upon rising powers, the enrichment of state and corporate elites in all parts of the 
world has meant that energy security and growth continue to trump efforts to seriously reverse either 
energy poverty or climate change. While inter-state balances of power have shifted, intra and trans state 
power imbalances between competing social forces persist with the result that market liberal transitions 
prevail over broader social and economic transformations of energy politics. 
 
6. Conclusions: Towards Transformation 
‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a 
great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci, 1971). 
 ‘We are entering the declining decades of the fossil fuel era, that brief episode of human time when coal miners 
and oil workers moved an extraordinary quantity of energy ..up to the earth’s surface, where engines, boilers, 
blast furnaces and turbines burned it at an ever increasing rate, providing the mechanical force that made possible 
modern industrial life.. electrical power and communication, global trade, military run empires and the 
opportunity for more democratic forms of politics’ (Mitchell, 2011:231). 
 
It is clearly too early to call time on the current fossil fuel energy regime and confidently label it a 
temporary, transient phase in the history of socio-ecological evolution as Tim Mitchell does in the quote 
above, implying that the global trade regime and military empires that characterise the contemporary 
world are in inevitable and terminal decline. Or to have the luxury to look beyond it, sure that a new 
energy order is in the process of being born out of the current interregnum (to borrow a phrase from 
Gramsci in the quote above), even if we are not yet sure what form it will take. While the ‘morbid 
symptoms’ produced by the old order are clear for all to see, the new order lacks a powerful author. 
There is still an awful lot of work to do in moving from one energy order to another. 
 
An IPE analysis can bring to this debate a re-centring of the question of transitions as being one about 
how to dislodge an incumbent order resting on a tight alignment between a global economy materially 
dependent upon fossil fuels, global and national political institutions working to protect productive 
capital tied up in such an economy and deploying discourses of accommodation around green growth 
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and climate-compatible development. These advance what Gramsci referred to as ‘trasformismo’ and 
not transformation, by protecting existing structures of power from the threat to their legitimacy and 
profitability which climate change presents. This takes us beyond a focus on a national level ‘regime’ 
or set of socio-technical practices to address a set of actors, global networks and relations of power 
which sustain and benefit from a fossil-fuel dependent economy whose continued growth threatens the 
future habitability of life on Earth. There are intimate (though not mono-casual and linear) links between 
power, production and world order. World order, within which global governance is one concrete 
expression, both protects the existing structure of production and reinforces existing relations of power 
using disciplinary power to lock in dependence upon a global economy organised around fossil fuels 
and a set of policy measures compatible with neo-liberal globalisation in which needed state control 
over the energy sector is harder to exercise and in which investor rights are protected and enforced at 
regional and global levels.  
 
State power remains a key terrain for the expression of competing views and interests about energy 
pathways which get transmitted into global institutions, just as global initiatives are translated and 
refracted through patterns of social power at the national level through the internationalisation of the 
state. Which interests are advanced and protected and which get overlooked is often a function of the 
material and productive base of the economy and how far it relies upon high carbon forms of energy. 
For Gramsci, hegemony implies ‘not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual 
and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages’ (1971: 181-2). Moreover, 
‘the development and expansion of the [dominant] group are conceived of, and presented, as being the 
motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the national energies’. The recent attempts 
by oil majors to invoke energy poverty as a major reason for the necessary expansion of their industry, 
even in the face of climate change, is an obvious attempt to do this. In this way ‘the dominant group is 
coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups’ (Gramsci 1971: 182).    
 
And yet despite evidence of this mutually reinforcing relationships among ideas, institutions and 
material capabilities, this power is not completely hegemonic. Indeed, hegemony is never complete. 
Gramsci was alert to the fact that hegemony necessarily also creates vulnerabilities, fragilities and 
opportunities, therefore, to resist its reach. Rather emphasise the ‘static’ and ‘immobile’ in relation to 
social forces, he emphasises a ‘relation of forces in continuous motion’ pointing to the possibilities of 
a ‘shift in equilibrium’ (1971:182). In this sense, it aligns with the analysis of incumbent power found 
in the Multi-Level Perspective in transitions theory (Geels 2014), but rather foregrounds shifts in the 
balance of power between social forces.  
 
Here I have highlighted, in particular, the scope for shifts in the interests of capital in general as having 
the potential to bring about disruptive change—as restless finance capital has done many times before 
when the incumbent regime fails to serve its needs (Perez 2002). We noted in the discussion on 
globalisation the potential to enrol powerful fractions of capital in projects of de-carbonisation to move 
from a carbon economy to a climate capitalism where new and attractive sites of accumulation are 
created in a lower carbon economy, albeit one still characterised by the intrinsic inequities and patterns 
of exploitation associated with contemporary capitalism. This forces us to engage with questions of 
strategy: the coalitions and social forces that will be required to re-organise the global economy along 
low carbon lines and the constraints that any such endeavour is likely to encounter.  
 
But the  important task of identifying potential sites of change should not detract from the need to 
address the intransigence and resistance of the ‘incumbent regime’: those actors that benefit from the 
status quo and are thus likely to resist change. This is a far more difficult political economy. Neither 
the climate change regime despite the Paris agreement, nor carbon markets (where prices of carbon are 
at record lows) nor governments are sending powerful signals to the worlds of finance and industry that 
the future lies in sustainable low carbon energy. This will be key. While it continues to be profitable 
and legitimate to increase exploitation of new reserves of fossil fuels – even in the most extreme ways 
and with the most devastating consequences (through tar sands, fracking, drilling in fragile artic 
environments etc.) – finance will not shift. This should chime a note of caution about the imminent 
demise of the fossil fuel order. As Huber notes: ‘Any analysis of a mode of production beyond 
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capitalism, or the possible emergence of an “alternative energy economy”, must come to grips with the 
deep embeddedness of fossil-energy in the most basic forms of commodity circulation’ (Huber, 2008: 
112). As the current political economy attests, energy issues are at the epicentre of not only the 
geopolitics of empire and the global climate crisis, but also of the more banal, everyday reproduction 
of capitalist social life. It is also pertinent to recall that previous dramatic re-organisations of production 
and technology in the energy sector aimed at securing a new round of accumulation have explicitly 
sought to increase levels of consumption by making energy easier to access and distribute, and cheaper 
to consume (Fouquet 2010). Moreover, historical analysis of energy shifts suggests that in a growth-
oriented economy ‘even a major shift towards low carbon energy does not guarantee that the global 
economy will reduce fossil fuel consumption. Indeed, such a shift may simply promote overall greater 
energy consumption’ (Fouquet and Pearson 2012: 2).  
Empirically, this account suggests the value of further empirical work on unsettling incumbency: the 
specific modalities and strategies for un-doing carbon and the modes of power which protect it from 
being transformed. As suggested here, this might imply a focus on the potentially disruptive power of 
finance capital in conjunction with movements from below resisting extractivism and the building of 
new fossil fuel infrastructures. I also noted the need to view the unfolding dynamics between and across 
states as part of global networks and coalitions of actors, rather than as bounded and autonomous 
entities. The intimate links, highlighted here, between global (re)organisations of production and 
finance and constitutions of governance in the energy realm, suggest the value of following embryonic 
transitions empirically to explore their potential to evolve into the deeper and more disruptive 
transformations that are urgently required to counter the hegemony of the current energy regime. 
Overall, an analysis such as this, informed by critical traditions in IPE, provides a source of clues as to 
the prospects of steering the great forces of human history in more sustainable directions – in particular, 
towards the de-carbonisation of the global economy – by drawing attention to the relationship between 
states, the global economy and global governance. Hence whilst emphasising the links between 
production, power and world order may be thought to over-emphasise the static and hegemonic, it also 
serves to highlight vulnerabilities, weak spots and active agents of change, albeit at times ones which 
would not be regarded as progressive, such as finance capital, whose support for de-carbonisation will 
be critical to re-defining the needs of capital-in-general in the contemporary context. What the analysis 
also demonstrates is the centrality of energy to statehood, global governance, geo-politics and the 
globalisation of the economy such that the mutual neglect by IPE scholars of energy, and scholars of 
transitions of international political economy is no longer tenable (Kern and Markard 2016; Goldthau 
et al 2018).  
Such an account also implies a critique, however, of the idea that transitions, or indeed transformations, 
can be largely organised through idealised ‘transition management’, visions, or blueprints, without the 
acquiescence of powerful fractions of capital. This is not to downplay the role of the state per se given 
its willingness to intervene on behalf of capital in the ways described in the examples above. Rather, it 
is to suggest that the ‘animal spirits’ of capitalism in their restless pursuit of profit through innovation 
and (creative) destruction will be decisive. There was after all no blueprint for previous industrial 
revolutions. We run the risk, therefore, of allowing a mismatch between the theories of change implicit 
in many understandings of what is implied by low-carbon energy transitions, and what historical 
experience seems to suggest about how, when and why change in capitalism occurs. 
Hence a reading of the landscape of power exposes both the enormity of political lock-in – the interests 
and the durability of the order – but also of the scope for radical change as we have seen with the shift 
from coal to oil and now as the oil economy faces a growing challenge from a renewed ‘dash to gas’, 
the falling price of renewable energy amid the spectre of climate change. The evolving nature of the 
global capitalist system has both intensified and re-scaled the processes which have brought about the 
current predicament for society and constitutes the terrain upon which near-term strategies aimed at 
addressing climate change, and challenging the energy order which fuels it, will have to be developed. 
It is precisely an understanding of this terrain, how it has been formed historically through innovation, 
exploitation and struggle that highlights the dilemmas and contradictions facing progressive movements 
today. Though signs of immediate and drastic change are not abundant, there is significant movement 
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from below. It is worth recalling that transitions, let alone transformations, take decades or often 
centuries. Widespread public and political engagement with climate change is only 30 years old at best, 
and has intensified probably only in the past 10-15 years: set against the long durée of capitalist 
development, a very short time indeed. 
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